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Explaining Policy Failure: Japan and the 
International Economy, I969-I97I 
RO B E RT C. AN G E L Political Science, University of South Carolina 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the determinants of Japan's most serious postwar 
blunder: failure to define and implement effective and timely counter- 
measures to deal with its change from deficit to surplus international 
monetary status during the i969-i971 period. It concludes that intense 
bureaucratic compartmentalization and a lack of supra-ministerial 
leadership of national policy were key determinants of this failure, leaving 
Japan's political system dependent upon irresistible external pressure 
(gai-atsu), in this case from the United States, to define and force 
implementation of necessary policy changes. This critical but largely 
ignored episode illustrates a negative aspect of the traditional insulation 
ofJapan's national bureacracy from political (as opposed to administra- 
tive) interference in the definition and pursuit of basic national policy 
objectives. 
Much of the scholarly and journalistic material available today about 
Japan was written in search of the determinants of Japan's postwar 
'economic miracle'.' The natural consequence of this attention is a 
Japanese and English language literature heavily weighted toward 
description of the more positive attributes of Japan's econo-political 
system, those features thought most responsible for her rapid postwar 
economic growth. Japan's government has received much of the credit. 
Often mentioned governmental attributes include a highly qualified, 
relatively honest, and motivated natural bureaucracy; a preference for 
bottom-to-top policy initiative flows rather than the dictatorial top-down 
model implied as characteristic of other systems; an amazing ability to 
promote cooperation among groups with diverse interests; 'consensus' 
style policymaking which encourages the participation of all actors with 
even potential interests in any issue under consideration; and a minimum 
of interference from the political (as distinct from the bureaucratic) sector 
in important economic policymaking. 
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Although Japan's postwar Constitution clearly assigns ultimate 
political responsibility to a prime minister elected by the Diet and the 
cabinet of ministers he appoints, a minimum of political interference in 
the work of the bureaucracy, raises a fundamental question about the 
nature of theJapanese state. To what degree arejapan's highly respected 
governmental ministries insulated from the control of the popularly 
elected representatives constitutionally responsible for their actions? 
Questions of democratic principle aside, minimization of 'political 
interference' in the work of the bureaucracy may increase the efficiency of 
individual ministries as they pursue broad predetermined objectives. But 
it also may leave the system as a whole vulnerable to delay, even 
immobilization, when faced with issues that require fundamental changes 
in national policy over which powerful ministries disagree. 
In this paper I examine the determinants of Japan's most serious 
postwar blunder: failure to define and implement timely and effective 
countermeasures to deal with Japan's change from deficit- to surplus- 
prone international economic status during the late I96os to early 1970s. 
Extreme bureaucratic compartmentalization and a lack of 'supra- 
ministerial' leadership of national policy were key factors in this failure, 
making Japan's political system dependent upon irresistible external 
pressure (gai-atsu) to determine and implement necessary policy changes. 
Events 
From Balance-of-Payments Deficit to Surplus 
The architects of Japan's postwar economic growth and development 
were well aware of the importance of international monetary affairs to the 
achievement of their objectives. Japan had been driven painfully up 
against its balance-of-payments ceiling at least five times by the 
mid- I 96os, when rapid expansion of domestic demand increased imports 
and diverted exports to domestic consumption, reducing Japan's foreign 
exchange reserves to levels considered dangerous. This forced the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) to impose politically painful policies to 
restrain business expansion. 
The government made every effort to conserve Japan's scarce foreign 
reserves and to avoid the unpleasant consequences of those credit 
tightening exercises by vigorously promoting exports and restraining 
non-essential imports under the authority of the Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Control Law of 1949. They were very successful and 
Japan, as a result, entered the turbulent latter half of the I960s with a 
political economy-designed to cope with recurring bouts of foreign 
exchange scarcity, managed by officials highly skilled in its manipulation, 
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but with a system unprepared to cope with the emerging challenge of 
destabilizing international surpluses, a problem they found difficult even to 
imagine as late as the mid-i96os. 
The business boom that began early in I966, true to historical pattern, 
within a year pulled Japan's foreign exchange reserves below the 
psychologically important $2-billion level, and the government re- 
sponded with traditional credit-tightening countermeasures. Lack of 
improvement by March, against a background of turbulent international 
monetary conditions, inspired rumors within Tokyo's financial commun- 
ity and media of a yen de-valuation.Senior Ministry of Finance officials, in 
fact, considered approaching the IMF with the suggestion of a 
devaluation. But in public they made a vigorous effort to discourage 
speculation by describing the situation as just another trough in the 
postwar cyclical pattern that could be managed without resort to extreme 
measures. 
By August the international outlook was again bright enough to allow a 
discount rate cut and relaxation of 'window guidance'. The upward trend 
continued throughout I969 with reserves already reaching $3 billion by 
the end of the year. Rapid balance-of-payments recoveries had been 
achieved in the past. But the i968-i969 upswing was unique in that it 
occurred without a painful recession; the domestic economy continued to, 
boom. In spite of the upward-trending balance-of-payments perform- 
ance, Japan's GNP growth in I969, at 13.5 per cent, was only slightly 
lower than the 13.8 per cent recorded in I968, with no indication that the 
longest postwar business boom was about to end. 
Japan's sensitive international economic position was further aggra- 
vated during I969 by evidence of economically and politically dangerous 
levels of inflation. By the end of March the wholesale price index was 
increasing at a monthly rate equal to the annual rate for I968. Although 
more willing than West Germany to accept moderate inflation as a cost of 
rapid growth, the government could not ignore the possibility of 
double-digit inflation by the end of the year. A large increase in the official 
discount rate, from 5.84 to 6.25 per cent, was announced on 30 August, 
accompanied by increased bank reserve requirements. This too was a 
significant departure from customary practice, since for the first time in 
Japan's postwar history the government was forced to impose economic 
restraint measures to cope with domestic rather than international 
economic problems. These anti-inflation measures also strengthened 
Japan's propensity toward balance-of-payments surplus. 
Takafusa Nakamura, a noted Tokyo University professor of economics 
and former Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency's 
Economic Research Institute, has criticized this move on domestic as well 
as international grounds, arguing that monetary restraint was less than 
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effective against the wholesale price rise which was caused chiefly by a rise 
in the price of imported primary products. 
If a small-scale upward revaluation of the yen - for example, on the order of 5 to 8 
per cent - had been implemented at this time instead of monetary restraint, the 
influence of international price increases on the domestic economy would have 
been effectively checked, excessive increases in exports would have been 
restrained, and the desired objectives, rather than a large-scale recession would 
most likely have been achieved. (Nakamura, I98I, 2I7-2i8) 
Within an environment of declining confidence in the stability of the 
international monetary system and the US dollar, Japan's balance of 
payments began to attract a different kind of attention abroad. Foreign 
observers with increasing frequency suggested that the government take 
countermeasures to slow what by mid-year had become an alarming 
upward trend. Even the I969 OECD annual country survey on Japan 
released inJuly - one of a diplomatic series that normally avoids divisive 
finger-pointing - stated: '. . . with the attainment of a more adequate level 
of external reserves,Japan is, for the first time in her history, experiencing 
the problems of surplus countries trying to avoid undue strains on 
international liquidity.' (OECD I969, 5) The Survey specifically men- 
tioned the need for more rapid trade and investment liberalization. 
By late I 969, in the midest of the most severe crisis the Bretton Woods 
international monetary system had experienced since its formation,Japan 
had moved from deficit-prone to surplus-prone status, a change which, 
under Bretton Woods rules, required a fundamental re-ordering of 
Tokyo's international monetary priorities. 
Early Official Response 
With rumors of a devaluation less than two years old, Japan's 
international moneymen were, with some justification, less optimistic 
about their international monetary future than were their foreign critics. 
Front-line troops with decades of experience in the battle against foreign 
reserve scarcity, they publicly described their position in the late I 96os as 
an unusually high point in the traditional up-and-down pattern. They 
were determined to avoid any hasty, irreversible response to increasingly 
intense foreign demands for change that might permanently weaken their 
nation's ability to accumulate foreign exchange, and instead focused their 
energies upon neutralizing international pressure for change until the 
situation returned to 'normal'. 
The late Taizo Hayashi, in I 969 director of the Research Division of the 
Finance Minister's Secretariat and later Deputy Director General of the 
MOF International Monetary Bureau, revealed in a post-retirement 
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article that the Ministry was well aware at the time that Japan had 
experienced a fundamental change in its relationship with the world 
economy. MOF economists, according to Hayashi, prepared quarterly a 
shojiki besu [candid basis] projection of domestic and internaitonal 
economic trends for the next six quarters in addition to their regularly 
published projections. These projections were used only for internal MOF 
policy discussions, kept secret, in principle, to avoid the effect of public 
release. In I977 Hayashi wrote that according to the MOF's I969 shojiki 
besu estimates, Japan's balance of payments had hit bottom around I96I 
or I962, and thereafter, with periodic ups-and-downs, it was likely to 
register a surplus. (3 I January I977, 38) In other words, MOF economists 
privately accepted the main contention of the I969 OECD report. 
Still, official energy was directed toward public defense of the status quo 
at home and abroad rather than toward consideration of a substantive 
change in policy. For example, in early I969 after a surprising 50 per cent 
increase in foreign exchange reserves the previous calendar year, Finance 
Minister Takeo Fukuda argued that official reserves of even $3 billion was 
not excessive in the light ofJapan's international trade volume. He and 
other officials in public statements raised the possibility of bad times in the 
coming years during which the accumulated reserves would again be 
welcome, conveniently ignoring the more important issue of the speed of 
their rate of increase, and their continued growth under boom conditions. 
Japan's international moneymen did implement some temporary 
corrective measures during the late I960s in response to foreign pressure, 
most significant of which was encouragement of the 'yen shift', or 
substitution of domestic sources for the customary dollar-denominated 
international sources of import and export credit. As long as interest rates 
on domestic financing remained lower than international rates this yen 
shift policy helped to reduce Japan's total accumulation of dollars. Its 
effect was weakened though, once domestic interest rates began to rise 
later in I969. 
Foreign charges of Japanese protectionism also inspired public 
endorsements of more rapid trade and investment liberalization, especial- 
ly from Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan officials who had little or 
no direct responsibility for their implementation. In a routine that would 
become all too familiar during the next two decades, travel-weary officials 
just returned from international conferences at which they had been 
scolded for Japan's unseemly coincidence of balance-of-payments sur- 
pluses and heavy domestic market protection, declared the urgent need 
for more rapid liberalization during their airport press briefings. 
As foreign pressures increased, even the leaders of Japan's organized 
business community joined the chorus. For example, on I 3 October I969 
the Chairman and Vice Chairmen of Keidanren [Federation of Economic 
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Organizations] strongly endorsed rapid trade and capital liberalization, 
and promised to hold more meetings of their liberalization-related 
committees to promote the process. (NKSB, I4 October I969, i) As 
international tensions increased, it eventually seemed that all ofJapan 
endorsed - in principle, at least - the more rapid liberalization demanded 
by her foreign critics. 
The Cabinet on 17 October I969 announced an accelerated schedule 
for the liberalization of 55 separate items by the end of I971, an early 
example of what would become known in later years as a 'liberalization 
package'. (NKSB ev. ed., I 7 October I969, i) But implementation of the 
package came nowhere near the level of the widely publicized proposals of 
international economic meeting returnees, and nowhere near the level 
required for any lasting impact on world opinion.2 
As short-term steps to placate fuming foreigners while waiting for the 
return of the status quo, such efforts were moderately successful. But in 
longer-term perspective, by raising performance expectations abroad to 
levels higher than could or would be implemented, Japan's international 
reputation as a reliable and responsible world economic actor suffered as a 
result of this strategy, and she received little or no credit abroad for 
domestically painful liberalization measures even when they eventually 
were implemented. 
Plans also were announced in i969 to reduce the politically irritating 
accumulation of international reserves through expansion of foreign aid. 
During the first half of the I96os Japan's official development assistance 
had risen by an annual average of only 2.5 per cent, and between I 966 and 
1971 the average annual rate of increase was boosted to i6.2 per cent. 
Although impressive in percentage terms, it began from quite a low base, 
and again, the measures actually taken did little to dampen international 
criticism, let alone reduce significantly the troublesome foreign exchange 
reserves. In I 969Japan's official development assistance represented only 
0.25 per cent of GNP, nowhere near the 0.7 per cent level to which Japan 
was committed through OECD membership.3 
Less significant measures to cope with Japan's new international 
economic status included a 40 per cent increase in the amount of foreign 
currency businessmen and tourists could take abroad, plans to negotiate 
an increase in Japan's relatively low $725-million IMF quota, early 
repayment of World Bank loans, purchase of medium-term World Bank 
bonds, and even a change in the name of the 'Supreme Export Council' to 
'Supreme Trade Council'. Still, fear that foreign exchange scarcity might 
someday again dampen domestic economic growth continued to domin- 
ate the thinking of Japan's economic policymakers, making them 
reluctant to consider genuine reform measures. 
By the end of I969 a clear pattern of response had been established. 
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Each new threat to the stability of the international monetary system or 
shower of foreign criticism inspired: 
i. An official denial of any fundamental disequilibrium; 
2. Implementation of some technical, easily reversible adjustments, such 
as the yen shift program, expected temporarily to slow the increase in 
official external reserves; and 
3. A flurry of public relations efforts abroad by government and business 
sector designated speakers to seek the understanding ofJapan's critics, 
and to describe plans for more rapid trade liberalization in the near 
future, efforts maintained until the crisis or international criticism 
abated. 
Avoided at all cost was any policy initiative that might significantly 
affect Japan's long-term international economic competitiveness, espe- 
cially any consideration of a change in the parity of the yen - the one policy 
instrument over which the MOF international moneymen actually 
exercised direct and immediate control. According to former MOF 
Research Division Director Hayashi, by the end of I969 that subject had 
become what he labeled a sei-iki [sacred territory], upon which the MOF 
leadership allowed no one with international policy responsibility to 
tread. (3I January 1977, 39) Even in-house staff discussion of its likely 
consequences, according to Hayashi's article and personal interviews 
with other policy participants, was highly restricted. 
This prohibition against consideration of a change in the yen's parity 
was maintained - even strengthened - in spite of the mid-August I969 
I I. I I per cent devaluation of the French franc, and West Germany's 
surprise announcement of a Deutsche mark float on 29 September in the 
midst of a sensitive national election. Germany's decision leftJapan even 
more vulnerable to foreign criticism for lack of international economic 
cooperativeness and lack of any sense of responsibility for the health of the 
Bretton Woods system, and the yen more vulnerable than ever to 
speculative attack. 
Japan, however, remained adamantly opposed to a parity change, even 
within a multilateral context. During the I969 International Monetary 
Fund meetings Finance Minister Fukuda strongly opposed proposals 
which had been debated by the IMF Executive Directors since January 
for slightly more multilateral exchange rate flexibility on the grounds that 
the success of the international economic system depended upon firmly 
fixed rates.4 This refusal during I969 to support even a multilateral effort 
to introduce modest flexibility, a measure that might have helped to 
stabilize the system at that early date, and thereby to reduce chances later 
for changes of a more radical and unpredictable nature, gave clear 
evidence of that determination. 
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The Crisis Intensifies 
By early 197 I, international monetary instability occasioned by exchange 
rate rigidity and speculative international capital flows had once again 
reached crisis levels. The framers of the Bretton Woods agreement hoped 
to bring the world stable rates of exchange. They never intended that 
parities should remain permanently fixed. In fact, the IMF Articles of 
Agreement included elaborate rules by which parities could be changed 
once it was determined that a nation was in 'fundamental disequilibrium'. 
The drafters of the Agreement unfortunately did not (could not?) include 
a definition of that important term adequate to serve as a guide to action 
for the economic managers of countries experiencing imbalance prob- 
lems. Parity changes, especially for larger countries, were nerve- 
wracking, expensive events, a far cry from routinized adjustments to 
changing circumstances. 
International capital flows also created problems. The growth of the 
Euro-currency market, estimated to have reached $57 billion - a huge 
sum in 1970 - all largely beyond the reach of any government, the 
multi-nationalization of large corporations, the growing number of large 
banks with foreign branches, and even - ironically - the success of postwar 
capital liberalization efforts, all had helped to weaken that control and to 
increase the funds available to wager against the intentions of central 
bankers, intensifying the system's volatility. (de Vries, 1976, 496-500) 
Even more serious, Washington's new Republican administration 
suffered under the politically explosive combination of domestic business 
slump and inflation and increasingly severe balance-of-payments deficits. 
Those ominous signs and the politically potent domestic criticism they 
inspired combined to stimulate world-wide speculation on the possibility 
of some dramatic unilateral American countermeasure, and how such a 
move would affect the international monetary system when it came. 
In the midst of all this systemic uncertainty, the lives of Japan's 
Ministry of Finance officials once again were excited in late I970 by 
sudden gains in all four of their politically critical international indicators. 
Between October and December the global trade account jumped 26 per 
cent over the increase recorded in the last quarter of I 969, and the current 
account rose by 24 per cent. Foreign currency reserves had increased only 
$262 million between October and December I969, but were up $62I 
million during the same quarter of I970, a 237 per cent increase, bringing 
the total for the first time inJapan's history to over $4 billion. The bilateral 
surplus with the United States rose during the same period by 3 I per cent, 
recording as much of an increase in December I 970 for one month alone as 
it had for the entire fourth quarter the previous year. 
A severe domestic business slump during the first quarter of 197I 
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strengthened Japan's export performance and reduced import demand. 
The government responded with a 0.25 per cent cut in the official discount 
rate in mid-January, but a jump in consumer prices persuaded the 
Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan to resist pressure for further 
reductions, even in the face of British and German cuts at the end of 
March. (NKSB, 2 April I 97 I, ev. ed., i) The resulting disparity in foreign 
andJapanese interest rates weakened the 'yen shift' and added toJapan's 
foreign currency reserves. When the final fiscal I970 (i April I970 to 31 
March I 97 1) trade figures were announced at the beginning of May they 
showed Japan running the largest surplus in that account of any country 
in the world. Foreign currency reserves jumped another $i billion in just 
over two months, topping $5 billion by early March. 
Each Japanese balance-of-payments announcement was met with 
increasingly harsh government and business community criticism from 
the United States and Europe - criticism the Japanese press eagerly 
reported 'front page, above the fold.' These, and each spasm of the 
international monetary system, inspired a spate of speculative media 
stories about the timing and magnitude of the inevitable en-kiriage [yen 
up-valuation]. Japan's businessmen, still in favor of a fixed yen exchange 
rate but increasingly skeptical of the government's ability to hold out 
against the building foreign pressures for change, began to re-write 
international contracts to distribute revaluation-induced losses more 
equitably between themselves and their associates. The government 
responded to each manifestation of crisis with ever more complex and 
determined explanations of why a yen up-valuation was unnecessary, and 
of the disastrous domestic economic consequences of such a move if made. 
Why, they argued, should Japan alone consider a parity change when the 
Americans and Europeans were holding firm, still supporting fixed 
exchange rates? 
If Japan's international moneymen were not persuaded during early 
1971 that it was time to make a change in the parity of the yen, European 
moves in early May forced them to conclude that something more 
substantial than sophisticated explanations of their decision to do nothing 
was required if the government was to maintain the confidence of the press 
and business community. After numerous official denials of any such 
intention, similar in tone and substance to Japan's, West Germany was 
forced once again on 5 May to suspend trading in the Deutsche mark, and 
four days later to re-open their foreign exchange market under the second 
float in two years. 
Japan again was unable to avoid comparison. TheJapanese press corps 
and business community became even more skeptical of their govern- 
ment's ability to manage the situation. How long, they wondered, would 
Japan alone be able to run huge balance-of-payments suprluses without 
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taking more than the cosmetic measures so far implemented to reduce 
international and domestic criticism? While frantically explaining to the 
Japanese public and to the world the differences between the Japanese 
and German situations, the MOF international moneymen concluded 
that they must announce some positive action or risk losing control. 
The June 1971 Eight-Point Program to Avoid Yen Revaluation 
'Highly reliable government sources' began in May to respond to 
questions from trusted journalists with hints of plans for an early June 
economic initiative. With ample advance notice, the Economic Cabinet5 
met in emergency session on Friday afternoon, 4June. At the regular press 
conference following the meeting Finance Minister Fukuda announced 
the Cabinet's agreement on an Eight Point Program to Avoid Revaluation 
of the Yen in response to the international monetary situation. The eight 
points included: 
i. More rapid implementation of import liberalization measures; 
2. Rapid implementation of preferential tariffs for imports from less 
developed countries; 
3. Acceleration of the tariff reduction timetable; 
4. Promotion of the liberalization of restrictions on international invest- 
ment; 
5. Removal of non-tariff barriers to trade; 
6. Expansion of foreign aid; 
7. More 'orderly' expansion ofJapan's exports; 
8. More flexible management of fiscal and monetary policy. 
This ambitious program was confirmed the same day by Prime 
Minister Sato as Japan's official response to the international economic 
crisis. Its eight points recognized and proposed rectification for virtually 
every international economic complaint leveled against Japan. That is, 
every complaint save the most severe: the grossly undervalued yen. On 
this point, the program's title itself proclaimed Japan's resolve to stand 
fast. 
The eight-point program from the beginning enjoyed the strong public 
support of Japan's top political leadership, including Prime Minister 
Sato, whose statements were given maximum publicity both inJapan and 
abroad.6 The message of the publicity campaign was that Japan at least 
had decided to act, and in contrast to official MOF efforts prior to the 4 
June announcement to suppress public mention of balance-of-payments 
problems, they vigorously encouraged its discussion. Japan's internation- 
al public relations machine had something to sell at last. 
With the 1971 international economic crisis perceived and defined as a 
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balance-of-payments problem, the international monetary group within 
the Ministry of Finance naturally assumed primary responsibility. Thus, 
the 4June eight-point program was designed and drafted by a small group 
of MOF officials under the leadership of Vice Minister for International 
Monetary Affairs, Yusuke Kashiwagi. As the official custodians of the 
yen's fixed Y36o = $ i parity, defenders of what Hayashi called the 'sacred 
territory' of the yen's exchange rate, it was predicable that their definition 
of the problem and solution would include maintenance of the yen's fixed 
parity. 
Kashiwagi himself was vague about the authorship of the plan during a 
personal interview on 28 May 1976. But other policy participants, 
including Mikio Mizuta, who became Finance Minister in July I971, 
Jichiro Hatoyama, then Director General of the MOF Budget Bureau and 
soon to become MOF Vice Minister, Takashi Hosomi, then Director 
General of the MOF Tax Bureau soon to be named to succeed Kashiwagi, 
and Takehiro Sagami, then Director of the Research and Planning 
Division of the Finance Minister's Secretariat, all confirmed during 
separate interviews that the program had been designed under Kashiwa- 
gi's direction. 
The urgency of the situation, the technical and complex reputation of 
international monetary issues, and Kashiwagi's personal reputation and 
style of operation, enabled him and his group to draft their plan with a 
minimum of contact with official counterparts in other government 
ministries and agencies - the officials who would be responsible for the 
program's implementation. Once drafted, Kashiwagi continued to avoid 
the bureaucratic nemawashi process by obtaining the approval of his 
Minister, Takeo Fukuda, who in turn quickly presented the plan to his 
cabinet-level colleagues and finally to the Prime Minister as Japan's 
last-ditch effort to cope with foreign and domestic balance-of-payments 
criticism. It was then announced immediately to the press corps as the 
government's final plan. As a result, officials in other ministries learned on 
4June that the MOF international moneymen had decided that they were 
to make policy adjustments in their areas of jurisdiction which would 
extricate Japan from the MOF's balance-of-payments problem. 
It was after the plan had been announced to the world that attention 
was turned to inter-ministerial coordination. That responsibility was 
assigned to a committee composed of the directors of the Ministerial 
Secretariats [Daiyin Kambo-cho] of the ministries of Finance, International 
Trade and Industry, Agriculture, Transportation, Foreign Affairs and the 
Economic Planning Agency. This committee, under the chairmanship of 
the Ministry of Finance, met twice in June, and monthly thereafter, to 
review implementation progress to date.7 Each meeting was followed by 
public announcement of any progress, dramatic appeals for more rapid 
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implementation, and explanations that significant results would take 
more time. Substantive inter-ministerial agreement even on long-term 
implementation was minimal. 
Apart from some immediate minor changes and vague commitments of 
action in the future, the only meaningful accomplishment during the first 
few months was the 27 July announcement of a comprehensive economic 
stimulation program: reduction by a quarter point of the official discount 
rate and commitment of significant additional funding in the next budget 
to social infrastructure development. (NKSB 27 July I 97 I, ev. ed., i) 
However, long-standing business community pressure for more anti- 
recession government spending and a lower discount rate probably had 
more to do with the stimulation program announcement than did the 
eight-point program. 
So, if the real objective of Japan's liberalization package was 
implementation of measures intended to improve Japan's international 
balance-of-payments surplus situation, the program was a failure. This 
judgment was shared even by its main author and strongest supporter, 
Yusuke Kashiwagi (I972, I89). Every important sector of Japan's 
econo-political system made strong public statements of support in 
principle for the program. Cabinet ministers cheered the effort on with 
apparent sincerity at nearly every press conference. But colorful 
ministerial expressions of support at press conferences carry less weight in 
government than stern talks about career prospects with bureaucratic 
subordinates in the privacy of the minister's office. 
Keidanren issued statements supporting the program in principle, 
primarily on the grounds that it had already been announced abroad as 
Japan's official position, but did little internally to achieve business 
community cooperation with specific measures. The Japan Chamber of 
Commerce officially endorsed the program, but in mid-July tempered its 
support with insistence that businesses adversely impacted by liberaliza- 
tion should be compensated directly by the government. (NKSB i6 July 
I97I, 3) This question of government compensation was to bedevil the 
Ministry of Finance throughout the year. While the Ministry's interna- 
tional monetary men were anxious to press their liberalization plan on the 
rest of the economic bureaucracy as an alternative to a revaluation of the 
yen, the Ministry's budget officials were absolutely opposed to opening 
the pandora's box of direct government compensation for business losses 
which might be attributed to international monetary problems. Perhaps 
the most remarkable example of non-cooperation was the Japan Foreign 
Trade council's (Nihon Boeki-kai) vigorous public opposition and lobbying 
campaign against abolition of the export promotion tax system included 
under point seven. (NKSB 20June 197I, I) 
By the beginning of August 1971 there was little hope the program 
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could achieve agreement on liberalization adequate to avoid severe 
criticism ofJapan at the IMF and World Bank annual meetings scheduled 
for late September in Washington. If the MOF international moneymen 
still believed they would be able to continue to resist foreign pressure for a 
change in the parity of the yen, they were members of an exclusive 
minority. According to a poll of 222 political, academic, business, labor, 
and consumer group leaders taken by the influential economic daily, 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun on 30 June I971, 72 per cent said they opposed a 
change in the yen's parity, but 76 per cent said they thought it would occur 
by I972. (NKSB I July I97I, 3) Nonetheless, high level statements of 
support and optimistic forecasts for the eight-point program as Japan's 
final gesture continued to pour from Japan's official public relations 
organs. 
The Second Nixon Shock 
Just before Io a.m. on Monday morning, I6 August I97I, US Secretary of 
State William Rogers placed a direct telephone call to Prime Minister 
Sato asking that he and his colleagues listen to the short-wave Voice of 
America broadcast of a television address President Nixon was about to 
deliver in Washington [9. I 5 p.m., I 5 August, Washington time]. Rogers' 
unusual call, reminiscent of the embarrassing last-minute notification 
Japan received of Nixon's plan to visit the People's Republic of Chinajust 
one month before, at last transformed Tokyo's 'business-as-usual' 
atmosphere. 
In his speech, Nixon announced a comprehensive domestic and 
international New Economic Policy which included temporary suspen- 
sion of the dollar's convertibility into gold and imposition of a IO per cent 
surcharge on all dutiable imports, measures designed'. . . to make certain 
that American products will not be at a disadvantage because of unfair 
exchange rates.' The long-awaited second shoe had fallen at last. Nixon's 
speech did not include a list of specific American demands, but it was 
obvious that something more meaningful than international press 
announcements of possible future eight-point program implementation 
would be required to persuade Washington to suspend the surcharge and 
re-establish the dollar's convertibility. 
Global time differences and European designation of i6 August as an 
official holiday combined to leave Tokyo the only major financial market 
open when the Nixon announcement hit the airwaves. The response was 
uncontrolled panic. Traders rushed to sell export-dependent corporate 
stocks at any price with predictable effect on the Nikkei-Dow Average. By 
mid-day foreign exchange market dollar sales were reported to surpass 
$400-million, nearly all of which had been absorbed by government 
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intervention purchases. The afternoon press was full of the photojournal- 
ism cliche that accompanies news of international monetary crises in any 
country: large pictures of frenzied young men in shirt-sleeves talking into 
two telephones at once. 
Drastic American action of some kind had been predicted for some 
time, butJapan's government officials were caught without a contingency 
plan with which to face such a sudden change in their international 
environment. So they spent the first day monitoring the domestic market 
pandemonium, frantically scrambling to gather more specific information 
from a sleeping Washington, and arguing among themselves about what 
to do. 
The government could have closed the Tokyo market at any time 
during that first hectic day, a move, in fact, proposed by MOF 
Administrative Vice Minister lichiro Hatoyama. But Hatoyama had 
spent his whole MOF career on the more prestigious domestic side of the 
ministry, and thus was not considered - nor did he consider himself- an 
expert on international monetary affairs. The certified MOF internation- 
al monetary experts remained strongly opposed, arguing that Japan 
shouldn't be the first country to suspend trading, that they should wait to 
see how the Europeans would react on Tuesday morning, European time, 
and most important, that once the exchange was closed, Japan would be 
forced to make some change in the yen's exchange rate when it was 
re-opened. 
By the end of the first day of turmoil, MOF staff opinion was still 
divided between those who supported opening the exchange the following 
day with a controlled float, under which the parity would be allowed to 
rise gradually at a rate strictly controlled through government market 
intervention, and the international monetary specialists who argued for 
maintenance of the fixed Y36o-$ i rate.8 After a 6.30 p.m. meeting with his 
discordant senior staff, Finance Minister Mizuta decided to support the 
latter option, to continue to stand pat, persuaded by the confidence the 
international monetary specialists expressed in their ability to handle the 
situation without a float, his fear that a change in the yens parity would 
have a severely deflationary impact on the already depressed Japanese 
economy, and reluctance to haveJapan take any such fundamental action 
before they knew what the European nations would do. In a personal 
interview some years later, Mizuta recalled his actions and concluded that 
his decision to support the fixed rate had been a serious mistake. 
Late that night Mizuta finally made an official statement to the 
expectant Japanese press corps, the first since news of the Nixon speech 
had reached Japan, in which he assured the public of the government's 
intention to continue to support the current parity of the yen and to press 
for more rapid implementation of the eight-point program. In spite of the 
Explaining Policy Failure 189 
severe sanctions announced by Washington on the morning of the i6th 
and their inevitable tumultuous impact on Tokyo's foreign exchange 
market, and in spite of strong diplomatic - and downright undiplomatic - 
pressure from the United States and European countries, it took the 
Government ofJapan eleven more days to agree to move to a controlled 
float of the yen - their first substantive policy response to two years of 
international economic imbalance. 
Interpretation 
Japan's policymaking system during the I 969-71 period failed to respond 
to changes in the international economic environment and in her 
relationship to that environment until forced by paroxysmal, diplomati- 
cally corrosive, American external pressure in mid-August I97I. The 
economic and political consequences of that delayed response were severe 
forJapan, for her trading partners, and for the international system upon 
which the economic well-being of each, but especially Japan, depended. 
No imaginable measure of Japanese trade and investment liberaliza- 
tion, or even of yen up-valuation, during the period would have improved 
operation of the IMF system to the point that it no longer required 
fundamental systemic reform. But certainly Japan's domestic economy 
would have benefited from earlier, self-initiated liberalization of out- 
dated protectionist laws and regulations. And, according to Professor 
Nakamura, the longer-term advantages forJapan of a modest yen upward 
valuation in response to the imported inflation experienced in I 969 would 
have been enormous. 
Actual impact on the trade statistics would have been delayed, but 
early implementation of these measures at least would have reduced the 
rate of increase inJapan's sensitive balance-of-payments surpluses. It also 
would have reduced speculative purchases of yen, calmed the Tokyo 
foreign exchange market, and reduced the need to impose trade-stifling 
foreign exchange controls. Official reserves would have accumulated 
throughout the period at a less alarming rate, and Japan's 'designated 
speakers' would have gone out into the world armed with more persuasive 
arguments and far more credibility. 
The political advantages of an early, self-initiated response would have 
been more important. Self-initiated liberalization and parity adjustment 
would have been a less wrenching experience, less uncertain, more easily 
controlled, with more predictable outcomes. They would have soothed 
official and private international criticism of Japan as a selfish, 
neo-mercantilist power, making harsh countermeasures by other nations, 
like the I5 August Nixon Shock, more difficult to justify. Meaningful 
self-initiated liberalization and up-valuation would have made a great 
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improvement in the tone of the US-Japan economic dialogue, to the 
long-term benefit of both countries. It would have shortened considerably 
the period of uncertainty required to reach final agreement on a 
re-ordering of the IMF system once that process began at the end of 
August 197I by reducing on all sides the time required for theatrical 
posturing, and by soothing European concerns about cross-rate problems 
with Japan. 
With the potential for such gain, why didJapan's system fail to respond 
with appropriate countermeasures of its own to changes in its relationship 
with the international economic environment? The simple explanation is 
that Ministry of Finance officials with responsibility for international 
monetary affairs controlled Japan's official response. They opposed any 
meaningful change in policy, confident the status quo was inJapan's best 
long-term interests, and confident they could weather the storm of 
international criticism through skilful manipulation of international elite 
and public opinion. They particularly opposed any change in the parity of 
the yen, the one area of policy relevant to the problem over which they had 
immediate control. After decades of struggle against limitations on 
Japan's domestic economic growth and development imposed by foreign 
exchange scarcity, career government personnel of the agency charged 
with balance-of-payments oversight instinctively rejected any policy 
option that would weaken Japan's future ability to accumulate balance- 
of-payments surpluses. 
There is nothing unusual about dedicated civil servants assigned for 
many years to one job equating their own area of responsibility with the 
national interest, and defending their turf with great ferocity from outside 
interference. The struggle to overcome bureaucratic rigidity when 
changes in environmental conditions dictate a change of institutional 
direction is a universal challenge for the senior management of all large 
private and public organizations. So, with responsibility for only one part 
ofJapan's international economic policy, the actions of MOF internation- 
al monetary officials alone do not explain Japan's failure to adapt to 
changes in the international economic environment with appropriate 
self-initiated countermeasures. 
In spite of the great influence of Japan's career bureaucrats Japan's 
Constitution designates the political sector (as distinct from administra- 
tive), especially the prime minister and his cabinet, as ultimately 
responsible collectively for the supervision of the administration of 
domestic and international affairs, and individually for each government 
ministry and agency. Long before August I971, Prime Minister Sato and 
his cabinet should have recognized this problem of bureaucratic 
sectionalism and have realized that the nation's overall, long-term 
interests would be better served by more positive action and demanded 
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change in that direction. They didn't. Why they didn't provides a more 
useful explanation of why Japan's policy process faltered in 1971 than 
would a narrow focus on one group of government officials. 
During personal interviews several years after the event, the nature of 
the issue - especially the exchange rate - was often given by the politicians 
and other political sector interviewees as a reason for their hesitation to 
intervene in the policy process. They described international monetary 
affairs as highly technical, impossible for amateurs to understand. They 
also said involvement was avoided for fear of being accused of trying to 
manipulate the foreign exchange market to their personal financial 
advantage - a situation similar to changes in the official discount rate. 
Several interviewees also commented that there was little politcal 
advantage to be gained from association with international economic 
affairs during the i969-7I period. Voters and financial supporters were 
interested in other issues; so then were the politicians. 
Another factor of more general significance which kept politicians from 
assuming a meaningful role is that things just aren't done that way in 
Japan. Etiquette requires bureaucrats to be deferential - embarrassingly 
so by American standards - during direct personal contact with 
politicians. But even greater deference is paid to the principal of 'political 
non-interference' in the work of Japan's bureaucracy. 'Political non- 
interference,' often compared favorably with the clumsy amateurism of 
the American system and the under-qualified political appointees it 
produces, has been described as an important factor in Japan's economic 
success, one which discourages the particularistic and self-interested 
meddling of politicians in the highly qualified bureaucracy's efforts to 
promote the national interest through formulation and implementation of 
'correct' economic policies. 
Chalmers Johnson describes this phenomenon in his impressive study 
of MITI: 
The Japanese bureaucracy jealously guards the practice of making no political 
appointments below the ministerial level; the bureaucrats believe that this helps 
establish their claim to be above politics and to speak only for the national interest. One of 
the bureaucracy's greatest fears is "political interference" in its internal affairs or, 
worse, a ministry's being made subservient to a party or a politician. Johnson, 
I982, 52) 
He associates this practice, which has survived the war and the 1947 
constitutional reform, with a 'separation between power and authority,' 
rooted inJapan's feudal tradition and the adoption of the Prussian model 
of the 'developmental state' during the Meiji period. Although Professor 
Johnson and most other commentators have emphasized the positive 
impact this separation of power and authority and minimization of 
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'political interference' has had on Japan's economic development, other 
observers have lamented this distortion of the principles of democratic 
government. But even those critics, concerned more with questions of 
popular control of the government bureaucracy, do not suggest that 
limited political participation inJapan's policy process could reduce the 
immediate effectiveness of its output. It is Japan's highly regarded career 
civil service which is relied upon to understand what is best forJapan and 
to do the right thing. 
This view was confirmed from a different perspective during my 
1975-76 personal interviews. By then, many ofJapan's government and 
private sector observers described the government's handling of interna- 
tional economic relations during the I 969-7 I period as a failure. Yet none 
of the more than one hundred politicians, political staff members, 
bureaucrats, businessmen, or journalists interviewed for the study were 
inclined - even when nudged - to blame Japan's political leadership for 
what happened. They blamed instead the bureaucracy or individual 
bureaucrats, charging that they, with their superior qualifications and 
experience, should have adapted their stand pat position to changing 
international economic reality earlier in the game. One business 
organization senior staff member, for example, repeatedly referred to the 
whole episode as a gyosei misu [administrative error]. Even interviewees 
openly hostile to individual politicians involved, to the LDP, or to the 
political sector in general, declined to settle blame for the policy failure on 
the politicians. 
Japan's national policy system seems at its most effective when 
implementing univerally accepted, clearly defined goals - especially those 
which fall under the exclusive, or near exclusive, domain of one powerful 
ministry, or at least those goals which pose little danger of inter- 
ministerial conflict. When external conditions change, and preservation 
ofJapan's most general, long-term national interests requires a powerful 
ministry or agency to deviate from established policy on issues it considers 
important, or when the interests of the client groups of two important 
bureaucracies collide, constitutionally mandated political responsibility 
for oversight and integration becomes something more than an ideological 
nicety. Here, in the realm of supra-ministerial policymaking, the 
performance of Japan's system is much less impressive. 
Lacking effective central political coordination of her separate 
bureaucratic fiefdoms,Japan, in a pattern reminiscent of the Occupation, 
once again in I971 substituted the deus ex machina of irresistible American 
external pressure (gai-atsu) for political decisions in order to force the 
required changes. With the simultaneous suspension of the US dollar's 
gold convertibility and the imposition of the import surcharge, the Nixon 
Administration in one crushing blow forced Japan toward the required 
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adjustments by rendering the status quo so obviously less appealing than 
the disadvantages anticipated from the necessary change. 
The application of gai-atsu was successful - at least in the short-term. 
Japan soon agreed to make significant adjustments to adapt to her new 
international economic status; Japan's political leaders avoided blame 
from any of their business group supporters for ordering the required 
changes. American political leaders and bureaucrats involved seemed 
almost to enjoy the opportunity once again to talk tough to foreigners, and 
certainly suffered no domestic political damage as a result. But the 
longer-term costs both for Japan and the United States were enormous. 
This episode left the policymakers and publics of both countries more 
resentful and suspicious of the other, theJapanese more inclined to see the 
United States as an insensitive bully and Americans more likely to see 
Japan as a devious, unfair exploiter of an international economic system 
which she was unwilling to support until forced. 
Gai-atsu, especially but not exclusively from the United States, has 
remained a significant, and increasingly unwelcome, aspect of national 
politics inJapan since this dramatic episode in late 197I. In the absence of 
strong centralJapanese political leadership, it continues to create serious 
problems both forJapan and for her diplomatic partners. Only a dramatic 
improvement at the supra-ministerial level, in the policy coordination 
functions of Japan's prime minister and cabinet, can provide an 
alternative. 
NOTES 
i. This material is adapted from my I985 Columbia University doctoral dissertation, 'Japan's 
Foreign Economic Policymaking Process: Response to the 197I International Monetary Crisis'. I 
gratefully acknowledge the guidance of my faculty advisors at Columbia, especially Professor 
James W. Morley, the valuable comments of an anonymous reviewer, and the generous financial 
support of Columbia's Graduate Faculty of Arts and Sciences, the East Asian Institute, the Social 
Science Research Council, and a Fulbright fellowship which financed a year of written source 
materials collection and personal interviewing during 1975-1976. 
2. Alfred K. Ho provides a contemporary summary and assessment ofJapan's liberalization effort in 
Japan's Trade Liberalization in the i96os (White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press, 
Inc., 1973), especially pp. I5-I9. 
3. For a US Treasury Department official's evaluation of the late I960s and the early I970sJapanese 
foreign aid program as it related to her overall international economic relations see Wilbur F. 
Monroe, Japan: Financial Markets and the World Economy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 
194-197. 
4. For an account of the IMF reform proposal see Margaret Garritsen de Vries, The International 
Monetary Fund: i966-I977, Vol. i: Narrative (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, I976), 
pp. oo-5 0I6, and for a report of Fukuda's comments see Nihon Keizai Shimbun, IOctoberI 969, p. I. 
5. Finance Minister Fukuda, Foreign Minister Aiichi, MITI Minister Miyazawa, Agriculture 
Minister Kuraishi, Economic Planning Agency Director General Sato and ChiefCabinet Secretary 
Hori. 
6. See, for example, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, i6June I 97 1, p. I, and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, IgJune I 97 1, p. 
I for the general outline of the publicity campaign. 
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7. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 26June I 97 I, p. 4, and 2 I July I 97 1, p. 3 for accounts of thejune andJuly 
meetings and public reaction to their press releases. 
8. Details of the intra-ministerial debate during the first day are taken from personal interviews with 
lichiro Hatoyama, Tokyo, 27 August 1976; Takasha Hosomi, Tokyo, I3 February i976; Yusuke 
Kashiwagi, Tokyo, 28 May I976; and, Takehiro Sagami, Tokyo, 27 May I976. 
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